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INTRODUCTION. 
 
 
 
Bourdieu’s practical logic of the social sciences and its implications for international,  
cross-cultural understanding. 
 
Preamble. 
 
The first collection of articles on Bourdieu in this series (Robbins, 2000) was divided into 7 
parts.  The first two parts were devoted to articles on Bourdieu’s ‘life and career’ and his 
‘philosophy of science/knowledge and his methodology’.  The last three parts were devoted to 
articles on the ‘transnational transmission’ of his work; on ‘applications’ of his concepts; and on 
suggested ‘ways of reading Bourdieu’.  The core of the collection was provided in parts Three 
and Four which, respectively were devoted to articles on Bourdieu’s ‘Key concepts’ – ‘cultural 
capital’, ‘habitus’, ‘field’, and ‘reproduction’ – and on the ‘intellectual fields’ within which his 
work had made the greatest impact – Education, Anthropology, Philosophy, Sociology, 
Linguistics, and Cultural Studies. This organisation was an attempt to stimulate consideration of 
the validity of Bourdieu’s philosophy of social science whilst, at the same time, following his 
theory in seeking to show how he regarded his concepts as analytical tools to be deployed 
strategically by means of the socially and historically contingent discourses of academic 
disciplines. Whilst preparing this first collection I had, on one occasion, the opportunity to 
discuss the table of proposed contents with Bourdieu.  He had little interest in articles which 
sought to offer an exegesis of his meaning, and he feared the reification of his concepts and of 
the discourses by means of which they functioned pragmatically in producing social 
understanding or social change.  He was primarily interested in the part on ‘applications’ and 
believed that this should be extended.  The criterion for judging his own significance that he 
wanted to adopt was whether the paradigm of his own research endeavour successfully affected 
the capacity of other researchers to analyse their own situations and engage critically as social 
agents with their social structures.  The retrospective understanding of what he might have 
meant in developing his concepts at various stages of his career and of the fluctuating power 
relations between academic disciplines or intellectual fields was primarily of interest only as a 
means to an end.  That end was that followers should generate their own concepts and work the 
system of intellectual fields in order to engage with changing social reality.  It was not his 
intention that his texts should become consecrated library items.  His conceptualisation had 
become socially and politically dominant, but he was eager to keep alive the hope that the 
influence of his dominance would be to encourage continuous subversion.  In spite of his 
‘success’, his international reputation as a Master of Contemporary or Modern Social Thought, 
Bourdieu did not lose sight in relation to his own work of the theoretical position that he 
advanced in “Champ intellectuel et projet créateur” as early as 1966.  Announcing his lifetime 
conviction that ‘even the “purest” artistic intention cannot completely escape from sociology’, 
he continued: 
“Even the author most indifferent to the lure of success and the least disposed to make 
concessions to the demands of the public is surely obliged to take account of the social 
truth of his work as it is reported back to him by the public, the critics or analysts, and to 
redefine his creative project in relation to this truth”.  (Bourdieu, 1969, 97) 
Bourdieu’s work was always strategic and his texts were instruments.  It was as if he regarded 
the texts as catalysts which acquired significance in social exchange but which could not be 
pinned down objectively in themselves. 
 
This second collection of articles on the work of Bourdieu is published almost three years after 
his death in January, 2002.  There is no more dialectic between his living production and our 
current reception.  The challenge now is to facilitate a response which remains dynamic, 
maximising the utility of his thinking and resisting its canonisation.  To a large extent, therefore, 
this new collection tries to move on beyond exegesis and debate concerning the substance of 
Bourdieu’s thinking.  It concentrates, instead, on his philosophy of the social sciences and on 
their methodology, recognizing that these underpin his vision of an egalitarian, socio-
analytically inter-active mass society.  It seeks to place the philosophy centre-stage, recognizing 
that new situations will demand new concepts and that the struggle between intellectual fields is 
also, globally, a struggle between national sub-fields - that, for instance, in cross-cultural 
encounter internationally, one person’s anthropology is another person’s sociology.  The 
collection reflects some of the continuing debates about Bourdieu’s concepts and some of the 
criticisms of his work, and it also gives access to some of the obituaries written immediately 
after his death, but the focus is on his engagement – with other people in interviews or through 
political action – and on the extent to which his particular philosophy of the social sciences 
enables his work still to relate powerfully to social conditions and traditions of thought in non-
Western as well as Western societies.  There is still, however, the risk of reification, of inviting 
the reception of Bourdieu’s philosophy of social science as his contribution to an ongoing 
academic discourse of the ‘philosophy of social science’.  By looking at Bourdieu’s work by 
reference to that of Habermas, the purpose of this introduction is two-fold.  It is, first of all, to 
offer a juxtaposition of the work of the two thinkers as a case-study of an encounter between 
different intellectual traditions1, and, secondly, to try to make clear that the global relevance of 
Bourdieu’s work today arises not from his contribution to an intellectual tradition that has 
developed in Western Europe but from his capacity both to relate to that tradition and to use it 
critically as a reflexive social agent.  Bourdieu’s Outline of a Theory of Practice (Bourdieu, 
1977) was only a transitional ‘theoretical’ moment.  It was a text in which he rejected the 
explanatory claims of  structuralism as such and proposed that objective social relations could be 
understood as a dialectical relationship between agents and structures.  It was only a short, but 
brave and defining, step to acknowledge that social theorists themselves are social agents.  There 
is a dialectical relationship between their theories and actions which puts in question the 
absoluteness and universality of the theories.  Bourdieu did  not present himself thereafter as a 
theorist of practice but as a theorist who practised the relationship between the two that he had 
articulated, recognizing that his theory was integrally related to the conditions from which it 
emerged and to which it was applied.  Emphasizing the contrast between the works of Bourdieu 
and Habermas leads inevitably to the question of the universal applicability of theories generated 
within competing Western European cultures.  The contention of this introduction is that 
Bourdieu’s emphasis of theoretically reflexive practice offers the possibility of analytically 
problematising the universality of the tradition which generated that emphasis in such a way as 
to contribute towards a participatory intellectual universification.  By contrast, Habermas 
provides an epitaph for eurocentric rationality. 
 
Setting the comparative scene:  Bourdieu and Habermas. 
 
Jürgen Habermas’s Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften (On the Logic of the Social Sciences) 
was first published in February, 1967 as a special supplemental volume of the journal 
Philosophische Rundschau.  It was published, with related essays, in book form by Suhrkamp, 
Frankfurt, in 1970.  Born a little earlier than Bourdieu, in 1929, Habermas had submitted a 
                                         
1  This extends further – and more positively – the line of argument I followed in Robbins, 2000, Part 
IV, (see xxxx of this collection). 
doctoral dissertation to the Philosophy Faculty of the University of Bonn in 1954 on “Das 
Absolute und die Geschichte:  von der Zwiespältigkeit in Schellings Denken” (The Absolute and 
History:  on the conflict in Schelling’s thought). In the same year, after studying under the 
supervision of the philosopher or historian of philosophy, Henri Gouhier, Bourdieu had 
submitted a dissertation for the diplôme d’études supérieures which was a translation of, and 
commentary on, Leibniz’s Animadversiones in partem generalem Principiorum cartesianorum. 
After the completion of his doctoral dissertation,  Habermas became research assistant to 
Theodore Adorno and proceeded to position himself philosophically by reference to the thinking 
of German philosophers of the previous generation and to the German philosophical tradition – 
writing on Karl Jaspers, Martin Heidegger, Ernst Bloch, and “The German Idealism of the 
Jewish Philosophers” before publishing Student und Politik (Habermas, 1961), Strukturwandel 
der Offentlichkeit (Habermas, 1962) and Theorie und Praxis (Habermas, 1963).  By 1965, 
Habermas had been appointed to the Chair in Social Philosophy at the University Frankfurt, 
delivering, in June 1965, an inaugural lecture entitled “Knowledge and Human Interests:  A 
General Perspective” which was to be published that year in the journal Merkur, reprinted in 
1968 in his Technik und Wissenschaft als ‘Ideologie’, and presented as an appendix to the 
English translation, as Knowledge and Human Interests (1971), of Erkenntnis und Interesse 
(1968).  Bourdieu’s professional trajectory was initially very different.  Conventionally, he took 
up a post as a lecturer in philosophy at a regional lycée (at Moulins in the Bourbonnais, north of 
the Auvergne) on leaving the Ecole Normale Supérieure.  He almost registered to undertake 
doctoral research, under the supervision of Georges Canguilhem, on “Les structures temporelles 
de la vie affective” (the temporal structures of affective life), but this did not materialise.  
Instead, he was conscripted in 1955 to serve in the French army in Algeria.  Whilst on military 
service and, subsequently, in an academic post at the University of Algers, he contrived to carry 
out what he was later to call ‘fieldwork in philosophy’, seeking to undertake research on the 
“’phénoménologie de la vie affective’, ou plus exactement sur les structures  temporelles de 
l’expérience affective”2 (Bourdieu, 1990, 6-7).  He was seeking, in other words, not to follow 
Husserl as a theoretician but as a practitioner of phenomenological method.  Bourdieu recalls, in 
his posthumously published Esquisse pour une auto-analyse (2003), how 
“… pendant tout le temps que j’écrivais Sociologie de l’Algérie et que je menais mes 
premières enquêtes ethnologiques, je continuais à écrire chaque soir sur la structure de 
l’expérience temporelle selon Husserl”3 (Bourdieu, 2003, 57) 
Sociologie de l’Algérie (Bourdieu, 1958) was, amongst other things, an attempt to represent the 
‘base-line’ or status quo ante of Algerian culture so as to make possible a phenomenological 
acculturation study, an analysis of culture change or adaptation as an affective process occurring 
over time.  Operating behind the doors of a German academic institution and within the 
intellectual confines of a self-confidently parochial, national philosophical tradition, Habermas 
sought theoretically to articulate a position concerning the relationship between theory and 
practice, knowledge and human interests.  Struggling with a sense of guilt at French colonial 
presence in North Africa, constantly aware of the risks and dangers inherent in seeking to make 
social observations in the midst of military conflict, Bourdieu sought to deploy theory to 
articulate vicariously the a-theoretical practical interests of the indigenous  peoples whose lives 
he found himself observing.   
 
 
Habermas on Knowledge and Human Interests. 
                                         
2  See the discussion later of the article within which Bourdieu made this statement. 
3  ‘…the whole time that I was writing Sociologie de l’Algérie and undertaking my first ethnological 
enquiries, every evening I carried on writing about Husserl’s account of the structure of temporal experience.’ (my 
translation) 
 
Habermas begins the text on which his inaugural lecture was based with the following quotation 
from Schelling’s Lectures on the Method of Academic Study: 
“The fear of speculation, the ostensible rush from the theoretical to the practical, brings 
about the same shallowness in action that it does in knowledge.  It is by studying a 
strictly theoretical philosophy that we become most immediately acquainted with Ideas, 
and only Ideas provide action with energy and ethical significance.” (Schelling, 1958-59, 
299, quoted in Habermas, 1971, 301) 
In introducing this passage, Habermas comments that 
“In the language of German Idealism he emphatically renewed the concept of theory that 
has defined the tradition of great philosophy since its beginnings” (Habermas, 1971, 301) 
and he defines that concept of theory as one in which 
“The only knowledge that can truly orient action is knowledge that frees itself from mere 
human interests and is based on Ideas – in other words, knowledge that has taken a 
theoretical attitude.” (Habermas, 1971, 301) 
It followed from the religious origins of the word ‘theory’, Habermas continues, that a 
separation is posited between the logos which is ‘a realm of Being purged of inconstancy and 
uncertainty’ and doxa which is ‘the realm of the mutable and perishable’.  Horkheimer had 
distinguished between theory in this traditional sense and ‘theory in the sense of critique’ and, a 
generation later, Habermas set himself the task of re-examining this distinction, starting with a 
consideration of Husserl’s The Crisis of the European Sciences (Husserl, 1970). Habermas 
contends that Husserl took for granted for most of his career the traditional link between the 
cultivation of theoretical knowledge and consequential moral and civilised behaviour but that, 
after 1933 and in the period in which he was writing The Crisis of the European Sciences, he 
began to fear that the ‘most advanced disciplines, especially physics, had degenerated from the 
status of true theory’.  (Habermas, 1971, 302).  This was the thesis which Habermas proceeded 
to consider in detail.  He distinguishes between the empirical-analytic and the historical-
hermeneutic sciences.  In their attempts to establish laws independent of human interest, the 
former have an affinity with the traditional, theoretical function of philosophy, logically 
concerned with unchanging certainties.  The latter are concerned with the uncertainty and 
contingency of human behaviour but they, too, ‘comprise a scientistic consciousness, based on 
the model of science’.  (Habermas, 1971, 303).  The development of the concept of ‘value-
freedom’ in the social sciences is indicative of an inclination to adhere to the tradition of 
theoretical detachment even in a field of enquiry that is primarily concerned with practice.  
However, Habermas insists, the separation of ‘values’ from the facts or laws established by 
‘neutral’ social science demonstrates the extent to which the original, ethical implication of 
theoretical knowledge has been lost.  In appropriating from traditional theoretical knowledge the 
capacity to give an account of natural constancy and uniformity, the sciences forfeited the 
integral relationship between theory and moral behaviour, the original harmony between theory 
and values.  In turning specifically to Husserl’s argument, Habermas identifies three steps.  
Firstly, Husserl claimed that ‘the possible objects of scientific analysis are constituted a priori in 
the self-evidence of our primary life-world’ (Habermas, 1971, 304), or, in other words, that 
objective scientific explanations are ‘the products of a meaning-generative subjectivity’ which is 
disclosed by phenomenological analysis.  Secondly, Husserl tried to show that this productive 
subjectivity remained concealed by the objective sciences because those sciences had not 
‘radically freed themselves from interests rooted in the primary life-world’.  Only 
phenomenology frees knowledge from interest and, thirdly, therefore, Husserl identified 
‘transcendental self-reflection, to which he accords the name of phenomenological description, 
with theory in the traditional sense’.  
 
For Habermas, Husserl’s mistake was a consequence of his failure to realize that the objective 
sciences - which he attacked, and the phenomenological reduction - which he embraced, both 
shared a common desire to exclude everyday human interests and practices.  Both were 
theoretical rather than practical, logical rather than doxic. Nevertheless, Husserl believed that the 
pure theory achieved by phenomenology by blanking practical interests would have the same 
moral benefits that had supposedly been the consequence of the theoretical orientation in Greek 
society.  Habermas argues, however, that theory was only capable of orienting human action in 
the classical tradition because it was a cosmology.  It was influential because it concealed the 
interest which it was representing..  It ‘derived pseudonormative power  from the concealment of 
its actual interest’.  (Habermas, 1971, 306).  In seeking, therefore, to generate a modern form of 
pure theory which would have a status and efficacy equivalent to that of the classical, 
cosmologically based pure theory, and would resuscitate pure theory in opposition to the false 
usurpation of theory by objectivist science, Husserl, in Habermas’s view, sought to emulate a 
wrongly conceived notion of classical theory and to erect a false idol of interest-free theory 
which was in denial of its interests as much as objectivist science.   As Habermas cogently 
summarises: 
“Our reason for suspecting the presence of an unacknowledged connection between 
knowledge and interest is not that the sciences have abandoned the classical concept of 
theory, but that they have not completely abandoned it.  The suspicion of objectivism 
exists because of the ontological illusion of pure theory that the sciences still deceptively 
share with the philosophical tradition after casting off its practical content.”  (Habermas, 
1971, 307). 
Husserl was as guilty of sustaining the ontological illusion as were the sciences which he 
criticised.  Habermas differs from Husserl in insisting that the objectivist claims of the sciences 
have to be counteracted by making explicit their basis in what he calls ‘knowledge-constitutive 
interests’ rather than by seeking to identify an interest-free, universal and transcendental, pre-
predicative form of understanding.  Husserl’s notion of ‘intentionality’, which he derived from 
Brentano, meant that the way in which we know phenomena is derived from the way in which 
the phenomena present themselves to us rather than from what they might be said to represent.  
For phenomenology, the categories of our understanding of phenomena are intrinsic to the 
phenomena themselves.  It supports neither the empirical investigation of reality nor the 
solipsistic emphasis on mental construction.  It posits a correlation and reciprocity between the 
way in which objective phenomena present themselves to be observed and the way in which 
subjective observers perceive them.  What was lacking in the work of Husserl – although it was 
perhaps developing in his late work – was the sense that the correlation might be socially and 
historically contingent rather than universally absolute. 
 
Habermas argued that different kinds of ‘knowledge-constitutive interests’ should be 
acknowledged without this implying any quest for a-historical, universal, transcendental, or 
idealist theory.  As he put it, ‘There are three categories of processes of inquiry for which a 
specific connection between logical-methodological rules and knowledge-constitutive interests 
can be demonstrated’ (Habermas, 1971, 308).  These three categories were the approach of the 
empirical-analytic sciences which incorporate ‘a technical cognitive interest; the approach of the 
historical-hermeneutic sciences which incorporate a practical cognitive interest; and the 
approach of critically oriented sciences which incorporate an emancipatory cognitive interest.  
There is, in other words, one kind of knowledge which derives its character from the human 
interest in controlling the natural world. There are laws of deduction peculiar to this technical 
interest, and Habermas cites Popper’s The Logic of Scientific Discovery as well as his own 
“Analytische Wissenschaftstheorie” (1963)  There is another kind of knowledge which derives 
from the human interest in defining meaning, and Habermas registers here his agreement with 
Part II of Hans-Georg Gadamer’s Wahrheit und Methode. The world of traditional meaning 
‘discloses itself to the interpreter only to the extent that his own world becomes clarified at the 
same time’.  (Habermas, 1971, 309-10)  Importantly for our purposes, Habermas elaborates his 
point here in the following way: 
“The subject of understanding establishes communication between both worlds.  He 
comprehends the substantive content of tradition by applying tradition to himself and his 
situation. …The understanding of meaning is directed in its very structure toward the 
attainment of possible consensus among actors in the framework of a self-understanding 
derived from tradition.  This we shall call the practical cognitive interest, in contrast to 
the technical.”  (Habermas, 1971, 310). 
 There is, further, a third kind of knowledge.  The systematic sciences of social action strive to 
emulate the empirical-analytic sciences, but critical social science recognizes that ‘information 
about lawlike connections sets off a process of reflection in the consciousness of those whom the 
laws are about’ (Habermas, 1971, 310) – a process of ‘self-reflection’. 
 
Having identified these three categories of knowledge-constitutive interest, Habermas returns to 
the task of defining the nature of the relationship between knowledge and interest.  We know 
from our everyday experience that knowledge provides reasons for actions which are other than 
the real reasons.  Consequently, all sciences have developed procedures to reject subjectivity and 
make an ostentatious break from subservience to interests.  Interestingly, Habermas refers to the 
development of a new discipline, the sociology of knowledge, which ‘has emerged to counter 
the uncontrolled influence of interests on a deeper level, which derive less from the individual 
than from the objective situation of social groups’ (Habermas, 1971, 311).  More importantly, 
Habermas contends, in seeking to secure its objectivity against the influence of particular 
interests, science ‘deludes itself about the fundamental interests to which it owes not only its 
impetus but the conditions of possible objectivity themselves.’ (Habermas, 1971, 311). 
 
By recognising that our ways of apprehending reality are circumscribed by the transcendental 
limits imposed by the three kinds of knowledge-constitutive interests, Habermas argues that we 
are confronted by the need to understand the fundamental interest which drives the human 
orientation towards scientific objectification in each and any of the three kinds.  He advances 
five theses.  The first is that ‘The achievements of the transcendental subject have their basis in 
the natural history of the human species.’  (Habermas, 1971, 312).  This might seem to imply 
that human reason is an organ of biological adaptation, but Habermas insists that knowledge is 
not simply a biological instrument but has an autonomous function in shaping the ideals which 
direct self-preservation.  This leads to his second thesis which is that ‘knowledge equally serves 
as an instrument and transcends mere self-preservation’ (Habermas, 1971, 313).  The three 
categories of knowledge are grounded in the interests of a species situated within the 
interlocking aspects of social organization:  work, language, and power, which leads Habermas 
to formulate his third thesis which is that ‘knowledge-constitutive interests take form in the 
medium of work, language, and power’.  They are not, in other words, Kantian ‘categories’ 
indicative of the characteristics of the universal human mind, but they are, however, related to 
archetypal elements of social organization rather than to the multiplicity of human practices.  
Asserting that the human interest in autonomy and responsibility ‘can be apprehended a priori’ 
since they are posited in language – ‘Our first sentence expresses unequivocally the intention of 
universal and unconstrained consensus’ – Habermas moves towards his fourth thesis which is 
that ‘in the power of self-reflection, knowledge and interest are one’ (Habermas, 1971, 314).  
This is an ideal unification which will only become possible when philosophy explores the 
historical struggles to realize the ideal instead of suppressing knowledge-constitutive interests in 
advancing ‘the ontological illusion of pure theory’.  Habermas’s fifth thesis, therefore, is that 
‘the unity of knowledge and interest proves itself in a dialectic that takes the historical traces of 
suppressed dialogue and reconstructs what has been suppressed’. (Habermas, 1971, 315) 
 
In the last section of “Knowledge and Human Interests: a General Perspective”, Habermas 
reaches his conclusions.  The sciences have achieved success by denying the knowledge-
constitutive interests on which they are based.  This has historically had beneficial aspects: 
fascist abuses of science were only possible because science had lost its confidence in ‘the 
illusion of objectivism’.  This pragmatic defence of an illusion, however, is not acceptable.  
Husserl was right to attack the objectivism of the sciences but wrong to seek to do so by 
resurrecting an underlying objectivism which corresponded with the theoria of the classical 
tradition.  This was to counter scientific objectivism with a philosophical objectivism which 
equally denied its origin in human interests.  For Habermas, both the nomological sciences and 
the hermeneutic sciences exclude the possibility of enlightened action, since the former operates 
on the assumption that ‘the practical mastery of history can be reduced to technical control of 
objectified processes’ whilst the latter ‘defends sterilized knowledge against the reflected 
appropriation of active traditions and locks up history in a museum’(Habermas, 1971, 316).  He 
concludes, therefore, that the ‘practical consequences of a restricted, scientistic consciousness of 
the sciences can be countered by a critique that destroys the illusion of objectivism’, and states 
clearly that ‘contrary to Husserl’s expectations, objectivism is eliminated not through the power 
of renewed theoria but through demonstrating what it conceals:  the connection of knowledge 
and interest.’  (Habermas, 1971, 316-7) 
 
Habermas on the Logic of the Social Sciences. 
 
In his preface of 1982 to the 5th edition of On the Logic of the Social Sciences, Habermas 
described the original text of 1967 as a ‘review of literature pertaining to the logic of the social 
sciences’.  The first chapter of that original text – ‘The Dualism of the Natural and Cultural 
Sciences’ - began by claiming that 
“The once lively discussion initiated by Neo-Kantianism concerning the methodological 
distinctions between natural-scientific and social-scientific inquiry has been forgotten;  
the problems that gave rise to it no longer seem to be of contemporary relevance.” 
(Habermas, 1988, 1). 
A triumphant positivism had dispensed with argument about the logics of different sciences by 
contending that the differences between sciences were the consequence of their relative degrees 
of development.  At the same time, the nomological sciences had been indisputably successful 
and were extending into ‘psychology and economics, sociology and political science’.  The 
historical-hermeneutic sciences no longer attempted to dispute the same territory.  Epitomised in 
the work of Karl Popper and Hans Georg Gadamer respectively,  
“… neither analytic philosophy of science nor philosophical hermeneutics takes any 
notice of the other; …” (Habermas, 1988, 2) 
There would be no reason to disturb this co-existence, Habermas suggests, were it not for the 
fact that the social sciences sit uneasily between the opposing positions.  According to latter-day 
positivists, a general and unified empirical-analytic behavioural science can be produced, but 
different disciplines within the social sciences have developed different models such that 
Habermas is forced to conclude that ‘the competing approaches that have been developed within 
the social sciences are negatively interrelated, in that they all stem from the fact that the 
apparatus of general theories cannot be applied to society in the same way as to objectified 
natural processes.’ (Habermas, 1988, 3). 
 
Habermas immediately embarks on ‘a historical reconstruction’ of the development of the 
situation which he had initially summarised.  He begins with a consideration of the work of 
Rickert who tried to confine the applicability of Kant’s critique of reason to the nomological 
sciences so as to make space for the cultural sciences which should be seen to be based on the 
relationship between facts and values.  For Habermas, Rickert’s mistake was that he began ‘by 
constructing the concept of culture on the basis of transcendental idealism’ (Habermas, 1988, 4).  
This was an incomplete transition from Kant to Hegel.  Contemporary thinking, as Habermas’s 
introduction had suggested, had renounced the attempt to find any unifying logic of all the 
sciences, but Habermas was eager to take up the challenge again, seeking resolution by 
endeavouring to dismiss Kant finally and to complete the movement to Hegel.  ‘Today’ he 
argued ‘such a movement can no longer begin with a critique of consciousness;  it must begin 
with a transcendental critique of language’.  Habermas suggests that Marburg neo-kantianism 
(as opposed to the Heidelberg neo-kantianism of Rickert) had reached this point in the work of 
Ernst Cassirer who avoided the category of ‘value’ and, instead, analysed ‘the logical structure 
of symbolic forms’ (Habermas, 1988, 6).  For Cassirer, the transcendental is made manifest 
through symbolic representations or objectifications.  Sciences, myths, religion, and art are all 
symbolic forms which have their particular perspectives without any of them possessing 
privileged access to ‘things in themselves’.  In spite of Cassirer’s advance over Rickert, his 
philosophy of symbolic forms remained a-historically concerned with the statically 
transcendental and, as such, still resisted any accommodation of historical dialecticism, whether 
Hegelian or Marxist.  Hence, ‘Both of Neo-Kantianism’s attempts to account for the dualism of 
the sciences were fruitless’ (Habermas, 1988, 10) and the only exception to the indifference to 
the problem which developed is found in the work of Max Weber who, as a pupil of Rickert, 
developed a methodology which sought to recognise ‘the ‘interdependence of social-scientific 
inquiry and the objective context to which it is directed and in which it itself stands, …’ 
(Habermas, 1988, 16). 
 
The corollary of Habermas’s ‘historical reconstruction’ was that he should seek to analyse 
whether social inquiry ‘is in the last analysis reducible to a systematized historical research or 
whether sociology as a rigorous science can purge itself of historical contamination to the point 
where, methodologically speaking, the natural sciences and the sciences of action have the same 
status’ (Habermas, 1988, 43).  In exploring the methodology of general theories of social action 
in the second part of the book, Habermas devoted chapters to ‘Normative-Analytic and 
Empirical-Analytic Approaches to Social Science’, ‘Intentional Action and Stimulus-Response 
Behavior’, and  ‘Three Forms of Functionalism’.  The next book was devoted to the problem of 
understanding meaning in the empirical-analytic sciences of action, and this involved chapters 
on ‘The Phenomenological Approach’, ‘The Linguistic Approach’, and ‘The Hermeneutic 
Approach’.  Whereas in his “Knowledge and Human Interests:  A General Perspective”, 
Habermas had defined his own position through a critique of Husserl, in On the Logic of the 
Social Sciences, his chapter on the phenomenological approach offers a close analysis of, 
instead, the work of Cicourel, Schutz, Garfinkel and Goffman.  Habermas identified two major 
shortcomings in the work of these followers of Husserl.  Both pointed towards the need for 
analysis of language independent of notions of consciousness.  The first shortcoming was the 
consequence of the disposition of phenomenologists to proceed ‘from the experience of their 
own individual lifeworld in order to reach, through abstraction and generalization, the 
accomplishments of the subjectivity that creates meaning’.  (Habermas, 1988, 112).  This is 
Cartesian and solipsistic and, in Habermas’s view, by contrast, 
“… the phenomenologically oriented sociologist must converse with the Other.  He must 
engage in a communication that links him with an other, and that, if the individuality of 
the lifeworld is of any importance, is also the only way to encounter the particular 
through the mediation of general categories;  for the spoken language in which we 
maintain our own identity and that of others is the only medium in which the dialectic of 
the general and the particular is carried out every day. We do not satisfy the 
methodological conditions of communicative experience by evading them 
phenomenologically.  If this experience is not to be prematurely cut off through seeming 
objectivation, it requires training in an already constituted realm, that of the inter-
subjectivity of acting subjects who live together and interact with one another;  it 
demands, then, the learning of concrete language patterns.”  (Habermas, 1988, 112-3). 
 
Habermas’s inclination to turn to linguistic analysis is most explicit in elaborating his main 
objection both to phenomenology and to neo-kantianism (connected, of course, to his disposition 
to perceive a neo-kantian orientation in Husserl’s work) – the objection that ‘the 
phenomenological approach remains within the limits of the analysis of consciousness’ 
(Habermas, 1988, 116).  Habermas claims that, following Husserl, Schutz saw the symbolic 
structure of the lifeworld as ‘constituted on all levels as a referential context in which every 
element perceived is grasped within a halo of other elements that are also given but not 
immediately intuited’.  He concludes: 
“Because primary experience is characterised by relationships of appresentation in this 
way, there can be systems of signs that become autonomous on the level of symbols in 
the form of a language.  Just as for Cassirer language, as one symbol system among 
others, is grounded in the representational function of consciousness, and the structuring 
of consciousness cannot be derived from linguistic communication, so for Husserl and 
Schutz as well, linguistic symbols are grounded in the comprehensive appresentational 
activity of the transcendental ego.  Monadological consciousnesses spin linguistic 
intersubjectivity out of themselves.  Language has not yet been understood as the web to 
whose threads subjects cling and through which they develop into subjects in the first 
place.”  (Habermas, 1988, 116-7). 
 
 
The Franco-German encounter:  Bourdieu and Habermas. 
 
As we have seen, Habermas originally held out the prospect of ‘grounding the social sciences in 
a theory of language’ (in his words in the preface to the 1970 edition of On the Logic of the 
Social Sciences).  But, as he says in the later preface to the fifth edition (1982), ‘This is a 
prospect I no longer entertain’, and he continued: 
“The theory of communicative action that I have since put forward is not a continuation 
of methodology by other means.  It breaks with the primacy of epistemology and treats 
the presupposition of action oriented to mutual understanding independently of the 
transcendental preconditions of knowledge.  This turn from the theory of knowledge to 
the theory of communication makes it possible to give substantive answers to questions 
that, from a metatheoretical vantage point, could only be elucidated as questions and 
clarified in respect to their presuppositions.”  (Habermas, 1988, xiv) 
 
The last thing Bourdieu ever wanted to acquire was a ‘metatheoretical vantage point’ and he 
might well have welcomed Habermas’s new desire to renounce the theory of knowledge in 
favour of the theory of communication were it not for the fact that, in his discourse and 
professional practice, Habermas seemed incapable of relinquishing a theoretical stance in spite 
of his theoretical rejection of it.  Partly by re-visiting his Algerian research, Bourdieu, as we 
shall see, spent most of the 1970s struggling to express what he wanted to say about social 
practice, firstly in Esquisse d’une théorie de la pratique, précédé de trois études d’ethnologie 
kabyle (1972), to be translated into English as Outline of a Theory of Practice (1977), and then 
in an article of 1976 with a title - “Le sens pratique” – to be adopted in a book, published in 
1980, which was to be translated into English as The Logic of Practice (1990).  Esquisse was 
translated into German and published by ‘Habermas’s publishers’ – Suhrkamp Verlag, 
Frankfurt, with the title:  Entwurf einer Theorie der Praxis auf der ethnologischen Grundlage 
der kabylischen Gesellschaft  (Outline of a theory of practice on the ethnological basis of Kabyle 
society)  in 1976.  Notice that the German title situates the study within an a priori 
Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft conceptualisation whilst, however, it also acknowledges explicitly 
that the theory of practice which is proposed is not, like Habermas’s study of 1963, a theoretical 
study of Theorie und Praxis (theory and practice) but, rather a presentation of ethnological 
findings.  This was a significant acknowledgement.  The first German publication of Bourdieu’s 
work – published by Suhrkamp in 1970 as Zur Sociologie der symbolischen Formen – had 
assembled five articles written by Bourdieu in the second half of the 1960s, some of which have 
not yet been translated into English.  These were:  “Structuralism and Theory of Sociological 
Knowledge” (Bourdieu, 1968); “Condition de classe et position de classe” (Bourdieu, 1966); 
“Champ intellectuel et projet créateur” (Bourdieu, 1966);  postface to E. Panofsky:  Architecture 
gothique et pensée scolastique (Bourdieu, 1967) – translated as “Der Habitus als Vermittlung 
zwischen Struktur und Praxis” (habitus as mediation between structure and practice); and 
“Eléments d’une théorie sociologique de la perception artistique” (Bourdieu, 1968).  The 
German title – for a sociology of symbolic forms – was deliberately suggestive of the work of 
Cassirer who had attempted to elaborate a philosophy of symbolic forms.  This was a legitimate 
suggestion, given that Bourdieu had translated and commented on the work of Panofsky, who 
was a disciple of Cassirer; that  he refers to Cassirer’s texts in “Structuralism and Theory of 
Sociological Knowledge” and that, as editor of the Le Sens Commun series for the Editions de 
Minuit, was about to sponsor, through the 1970s (between 1972 and 1983), translations into 
French of seven texts of Cassirer4.  Additionally, Bourdieu’s work was also known in Germany 
with the publication, in 1971, of Die Illusion der Chancengleichheit which assembled extracts 
derived from Les héritiers (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1964), La reproduction (Bourdieu & 
Passeron, 1970) as well as other examples of their educational research.  It was Suhrkamp, 
again, however, which sought to emphasize the symbolic dimension of the theory offered by 
Bourdieu and Passeron, particularly in La reproduction.  1973 saw the publication of 
Grundlagen einer Theorie der symbolischen Gewalt (Foundations of a theory of symbolic 
power) which contained extracts from La reproduction as well as “Reproduction culturelle et 
reproduction  sociale” (Bourdieu, 1971). 
 
My purpose in specifying this information about the reception of Bourdieu’s work in Germany 
is to suggest that Bourdieu’s work was first absorbed into German thinking in part in relation to 
educational change associated with the movements of May, 1968, but, more importantly, in 
relation to one of the strands of the philosophy of the social sciences which Habermas was 
examining abstractly at the same time.  We should recall that Habermas thought that Cassirer’s 
form of Marburg neo-Kantianism was as ‘fruitless’ (Habermas, 1988, 10) in resolving the 
dualism of the natural and social sciences as Rickert’s form of Heidelberg neo-Kantianism.  
Both were still attached to a form of a-historical transcendentalism in spite of their interests in 
history.  In the perception of the Germans in the 1970s, Bourdieu was seeking to develop a 
sociology of symbolic forms which would be in the spirit of Cassirer’s philosophy but which 
would reject the vestiges of Kantian transcendentalism and become resolutely socio-historical.  
                                         
4  Ernst Cassirer.  La Philosophie des formes Symboliques:  I.  Le Langage, translated from the German by 
Ole Hansen-Love and Jean Lacoste (1972);  II.  La Pensée Mythique, translated from the German by Jean Lacoste 
(1972);  III.  La Phénoménologie de la connaissance, translated from the German by Claude Fronty, 1972. 
Ernst Cassirer.  Langage et Mythe.  A propos des noms de dieux, translated from the German by Ole Hansen-Love, 
1973. 
Ernst Cassirer.  Essai sur l’Homme, translated from the English by Norbert Massa, 1975. 
Ernst Cassirer.  Substance et Fonction.  Eléments pour une théorie du concept, translated from the German by 
Pierre Caussat, 1977. 
Ernst Cassirer.  Individu et cosmos dans la Philosophie de la Renaissance, translated from the German and 
presented by Pierre Quillet, 1983. 
 
This perception, however, showed little awareness of the origins of Bourdieu’s thinking in 
phenomenological philosophy, mediated by Merleau-Ponty; in ethnographic studies in Algeria 
(until the translation of Esquisse); and, equally, neither did it reconcile Bourdieu’s philosophy 
with the empirical sociological research which he undertook in Paris during the 1960s in the 
Centre de Sociologie Européenne.  My endeavour is to show that the thinking of Habermas 
provides a framework for understanding elements of Bourdieu’s practice but, importantly, to 
suggest that Bourdieu’s work went beyond Habermas’s general categorisation precisely by 
emphasizing the ’practical logic’ of socio-analytic encounter rather than the philosophical logic 
of the social sciences.  
 
 
The Bourdieu – Honneth encounter, April, 1985. 
 
The key meeting-point for the encounter between conceptions of social science and for 
consideration of the social purpose of philosophical reflection on the validity of social scientific 
explanation comes in the interview which took place in Paris in April, 1985, between Bourdieu 
and three German interviewers:  A. Honneth, H. Kocyba and B. Schwibs.  Schwibs had already 
translated La Distinction (Bourdieu, 1979) into German as Die feinen Unterschiede, Kritik der 
gesellschaftlichen Urteilskraft (1982); was to translate Bourdieu’s Homo Academicus (Bourdieu, 
1984) as Homo Academicus (1988), and was to publish later in 1985 another interview with 
Bourdieu entitled:  “Vernunft ist eine historische Errungenschaft, wie die Sozialversicherung” 
(reason is an historical achievement, like social insurance) (Bourdieu, 1985).  Honneth was at 
the time of the interview an assistant in Habermas’s department at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe 
University, Frankfurt, and was to succeed Habermas in the Chair of Social Philosophy there in 
1996.  Honneth had already published in 1984 in the Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und 
Sozialpsychologie an article which appeared subsequently in translation in English in Theory, 
Culture and Society as “The Fragmented World of Symbolic Forms;  Reflections on Pierre 
Bourdieu’s Sociology of Culture” (Honneth, 1986)5.  The interview with Bourdieu was 
published in a 1986 number of Asthetik und Kommunikation which was partly devoted to the 
work of Bourdieu within a section which asked the question:  ‘Wiederkehr des Intellektuellen?’ 
(The return of the Intellectuals?).  The section included two articles by Bourdieu, a review of 
Homo Academicus, Martin Schmeiser’s “Von der Sozio-Ethnologie Algeriens zur Ethno-
Soziologie der französischen Gegenwartsgesellschaft”6, as well as the extended interview which 
was entitled “Der Kampf um die symbolische Ordnung” (The struggle for symbolic order).  The 
interview was translated into English and appeared in the same number of Theory, Culture and 
Society as Honneth’s “The Fragmented World of Symbolic Forms” as “The Struggle for 
Symbolic Order” (Bourdieu, 1986) before it was published in French in Choses Dites (Bourdieu, 
1987) as “Fieldwork in Philosophy”, which it was entitled when it was published again in the 
English translation of Choses Dites as In Other Words (Bourdieu, 1990).  In contextualising the 
interview, we have, finally, to remember that Habermas had given four lectures at the Collège de 
France, Paris, in March 1983 – perhaps, it has been suggested, at the invitation of Bourdieu who 
had been appointed to the Chair of Sociology at the Collège in the previous academic year.  
These were published as the first four lectures of Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne.  
Zwölf Vorlesungen (Habermas, 1985), to be translated as The Philosophical Discourse of 
Modernity (Habermas, 1987).  On his own admission in the Preface, the starting point for 
Habermas for these lectures (and those other eight added subsequently and, in part, delivered at 
Cornell University in September, 1984) was a speech which he had given in September, 1980 
entitled “Modernity – an Unfinished Project” which had already been separately published as 
                                         
5  included in PB1, Vol 3, pp.3-19. 
6  included in this collection as xxxx 
“Modernity versus Postmodernity” (Habermas, 1982).  This disposition to argue that modernity 
had taken a wrong turning was a theme, he argued, which 
“… never lost its hold on me.  Its philosophical aspects have moved even more starkly 
into public consciousness in the wake of the reception of French neostructuralism – as 
has the key term ‘postmodernity’, in connection with a publication by Jean-François 
Lyotard.” (Habermas, 1987, xix). 
As summarised by Thomas McCarthy in his Introduction to the English translation, Habermas 
was concerned 
“… to respond to the challenge posed by the radical critique of reason in contemporary 
French thought by re-examining ‘the philosophical discourse of modernity’ from which 
it issues.  His strategy is to return to those historical ‘crossroads’ at which Hegel and the 
Young Hegelians, Nietzsche, and Heidegger made the fateful decisions that led to this 
outcome;  his aim is to identify and clearly mark out a road indicated but not taken:  the 
determinate negation of subject-centred reason by reason understood as communicative 
action.”  (Habermas, 1987, vii). 
Habermas clearly regarded his young assistant – Honneth – as an ally in his campaign against 
French postmodernism.  The above reference to the publication of Lyotard’s La condition 
postmoderne (1979) has a footnote which, in part, reads: 
“… On this see Axel Honneth, “Der Affekt gegen das Allgemeine7,” Merkur 430 
(December, 1984): 893ff; …” 
 
It seems clear that the interview between Bourdieu and Honneth, Kocyba, and Schwibs was, on 
both sides, a conscious representation of an encounter between intellectual traditions and, tacitly, 
an opportunity for both sides to seek to define their attitude towards Habermas’s incipient 
resolution of the modernity/postmodernity debate. 
 
It is possible to try to analyse the development of Bourdieu’s thinking by reference both to the 
terminology adopted by Habermas  in On the Logic of the Social Sciences and Knowledge and 
Human Interests (that is, in the 1960s) and to the categorisation of 19th century German thought 
presented in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity.   The form of questioning adopted by 
Honneth and his colleagues colluded, as it were, in this operation.  As published in German (but 
neither in the French nor English translations), Honneth introduced the discussion by indicating 
that he and his colleagues wanted to pursue four main strands of enquiry.  The first was that they 
wanted to find out more about ‘das geistige Klima … in dem Ihre Theorie entstand’ (the 
intellectual climate in which Bourdieu’s theory originated)  From the outset, therefore, the 
attempt was being made to understand Bourdieu’s ‘theory’ even though his rejection of social 
theory in favour of sociological method in his article of  1968 entitled “Structuralism and Theory 
of Sociological Knowledge” (Bourdieu, 1968) had already appeared in German translation in 
Zur Sociologie der symbolischen Formen (Bourdieu, 1970). It was in response to this initial line 
of enquiry that Bourdieu first explicitly made public the extent of the influence of Husserl and 
Heidegger in his intellectual formation.  (It was only after the reissue of his 1975 article on 
“L’ontologie politique de Martin Heidegger” (Bourdieu, 1975) [the political ontology of Martin 
Heidegger] in 1988 (Bourdieu, 1988) as a book with the same title that Bourdieu was prepared 
to articulate in a subsequently untranslated conversation, published in German, with H. Woetzel 
about the ‘Heidegger Controversy’, that ‘… ich glaube, ich wäre sein bester Verteidiger’ [I think 
I could be his best defender] (Bourdieu, 1988).  Similarly, it was here that Bourdieu admitted 
that although, during his student days in the early 1950s, he had “… never really got into the 
existentialist mood”, nevertheless, 
                                         
7  (feeling/affectivity versus the universal) – see later for a discussion of the correspondence between 
Honneth’s title and the implicit structuring of the 1984 interview with Bourdieu. 
“Merleau-Ponty was something different, at least in my view.  He was interested in the 
human sciences and in biology, …” (Bourdieu, 1990, 5). 
Although it is patently clear from reading Bourdieu’s work on art perception of the 1960s and 
from the development of the concepts of ‘habitus’ and ‘hexis’ that Bourdieu had been well 
aware of, respectively, Merleau-Ponty’s La phénoménologie de la perception (Merleau-Ponty, 
1945) and his La structure du comportement (Merleau-Ponty, 1942), it is significant that 
Bourdieu emphasizes that the interest of Merleau-Ponty was that he made contacts between 
biology and the human sciences.  We know from Bourdieu’s posthumously published Esquisse 
pour une auto-analyse (Bourdieu, 2003) that he registered to carry out doctoral research under 
the supervision of Georges Canguilhem whose specialist interest was in philosophy and the 
history of medical science and who was to support Foucault in his early studies of madness and 
civilisation.  In short, Bourdieu’s responses indicated that, through the mediation of Merleau-
Ponty, he was familiar with the French post-war interpretation of Husserl which established 
links between Husserl’s methodology and elements of Bergson’s vitalism.  In other words, the 
version of Husserl’s philosophy with which Bourdieu had become familiar was a version which 
did not correspond with that criticised by Habermas in Knowledge and Human Interests.  It was, 
as Habermas wanted, a Husserl stripped of his transcendentalism but, as Habermas did not want, 
it was also a Husserl integrated with a tradition of irrationality. 
 
The second strand of questioning proposed by Honneth was designed to situate the 
‘theoretischen Grundannahmen Ihrer soziologischen Forschungen’ (the fundamental, theoretical 
assumptions of your sociological researches).  It was here that Bourdieu was cross-examined 
about the transition in his professional stance from ‘philosophy’ to ‘sociology’.  He discussed 
the part played by Lévi-Strauss in making a social science ‘respectable’ (Bourdieu, 1990, 6) and 
also referred to Foucault’s translation of Kant’s Anthropologie du point de vue pragmatique 
(Foucault, 1964) for which Foucault had also prepared a thèse complémentaire (unpublished, 
known or not known by Bourdieu?) in which he had argued that Kant’s late inclination to 
develop a pragmatic anthropology which would analyse what ‘man has made of man’ was 
inhibited by his prior critical philosophy which predisposed him to operate with a view of an a-
historical, non-contingent notion of man possessing universal characteristics, particularly 
transcendental rationality.  Foucault had argued that the only way out of Kant’s impasse was to 
follow the path taken by Nietzsche.  Bourdieu suggested, therefore, that there had been social 
factors which had led him to make the transition from philosophical training to sociological 
research.  It was Honneth who pursued this point and probed Bourdieu as to why he had first 
undertaken research which was ethnological, eliciting the response: 
“Ich hatte Untersuchungen zur ‘Phänomenologie des Gefühlslebens’ unternommen, oder 
genauer:  zu den Zeitstrukturen der affektiven Erfahrung.” Bourdieu, 1986, 146) 
where the French and English rendering of ‘Gefühlsleben’ is, respectively, ‘la vie affective’ and 
‘emotional life’ and of ‘affektiven Erfahrung’ is ‘l’expérience affective’ and ‘emotional 
experience’.  The important point is that Bourdieu was wanting to insist that he had not 
conducted research primarily as an ethnologist but as a philosopher who was seeking to explore 
philosophical problems empirically. (The subsidiary point is that the English translations as 
‘emotional’ wrongly push Bourdieu’s interest towards that of Sartre in his Esquisse d’une 
théorie des emotions (Sartre, 1939) [Outline of a Theory of the Emotions] whereas Bourdieu’s 
interest was in the phenomenological analysis of inter-subjective or cross-cultural affectivity).   
Bourdieu continued: 
“To reconcile my need for rigour with philosophical research, I wanted to study biology 
and so on.  I thought of myself as a philosopher and it took me a very long time to admit 
to myself that I had become an ethnologist. … I undertook both research that could be 
called ethnological – on kinship, ritual and the pre-capitalist economy – and research that 
could be described as sociological, especially statistical surveys that I carried out with 
my friends from the INSEE8, Darbel, Rivet and Seibel, from whom I learned a great 
deal.”  (Bourdieu, 1990, 7) 
 
There is an important sense, of course, in which Bourdieu never ‘became an ethnologist’.  
Kocyba interjected to ask whether, as an ethnologist, Bourdieu was really self-taught 
(‘Autodidakt’), to which Bourdieu replied:  ‘Nicht nur in Ethnologie’ (not only in ethnology).  I 
have argued recently in several articles that Bourdieu’s time in Algeria is to be seen as one of 
methodological apprenticeship in which he tested the utility of various conceptual frameworks 
in trying to represent the condition of pre-colonial Algerian societies (in Sociologie de l’Algérie) 
as a prerequisite for understanding the processes of cultural adaptation imposed on indigenous 
populations by colonial control.  I have suggested that he explored the validity of the Weberian 
interpretation of protestantism in his representation of the Islamic fundamentalism of the  
Moabites9, and explored the validity of the Durkheimian notion of ‘mechanical solidarity’ in his 
account of the social organisation of the Kabyles10.  Equally, what had originally been ‘pure’ 
photographic observation11 was modified in the second edition of the text, following his 
attendance at Lévi-Strauss’s seminar at the Collège de France in 1960, so that his findings were 
presented diagrammatically as a series of binary oppositions.  This was in 1962, a year before 
Bourdieu wrote his quintessentially structuralist analysis to be published later in the decade in a 
collection celebrating Lévi-Strauss’s 60th birthday: “La maison kabyle ou le monde renversé” 
(Bourdieu, 1970). 
 
Having ‘become’ an ethnologist, Bourdieu was invited by Raymond Aron to become secretary 
to his research group – the Centre de Sociologie Européenne.  In accordance with Aron’s 
wishes, Passeron – whose trajectory had not been unlike Bourdieu’s, passing from philosophical 
training at the Ecole Normale Supérieure, through military service in Algeria, to a post in Aron’s 
research group – rapidly acquired the competence to teach Weber.  Together, Bourdieu and 
Passeron sought to carry out sociological research, in relation to students, photography and 
museums.  Together, they attempted to carry out the kinds of neo-positivist, quantitative 
analyses which seemed to be the norm for sociological research imposed at the time through 
American influence.  Together, they wrote “Sociology and Philosophy in France since 1945:  
Death and Resurrection of a Philosophy  without Subject” (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1967) in 
which they sought to redefine Durkheimian positivism by accommodating it to a ‘relationalism’ 
derived from Cassirer and also sought to situate their own work in an exemplary relational 
manner in relation to the competing fields of Philosophy and Sociology in post-war France.  
Together, and with J.-C.Chamboredon, they produced Le métier de sociologue: préalables 
épistémologiques (Bourdieu, Chamboredon, & Passeron, 1968) in which, in concluding the 
introduction on ‘epistemology and methodology’, they argued that, as Bourdieu would later put 
it, sociology had to constitute itself as an autonomous field.  Citing Durkheim in support, they 
argued for the establishment of a professional community which would co-exist with the 
establishment of an epistemic community: 
“In short, the scientific community has to provide itself with specific forms of social 
interchange, and, like Durkheim, one is entitled to see a symptom of its heteronomy in 
the fact that, in France at least, and even today, it is too often responsive to the non-
scientific enticements of intellectual ‘worldliness’: ‘We believe,’ wrote Durkheim at the 
                                         
8  The National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies. 
9  see Robbins, 2003a. 
10  see Robbins, 2003b 
11  see Bourdieu’s discussion of his Algerian photography in conversation with Franz Schultheis in Bourdieu, 
2003, and his philosophical discussion (contemporary with the research on photography undertaken for Un Art 
Moyen [Bourdieu, Boltanski, Castel, Chamboredon, 1965]) of the possibility or impossibility of such ‘pure’ 
photographic observation in “Les paradoxes de l’automate” (Bourdieu, 1967). 
end of The Rules of Sociological Method, ‘that the time has come for sociology to 
renounce worldly successes, sp to speak, and to take on the character which befits all 
science.  Thus it will gain in dignity and authority what it will perhaps lose in 
popularity.’12” (Bourdieu, Passeron & Chamboredon, 1991, 77) 
 
During the 1960s, in the terms outlined by Habermas in Knowledge and Human Interests, 
Bourdieu and Passeron espoused a deliberate attachment to the practice of empirical-analytical 
sociological research. An underlying assumption of Le métier de sociologue (Bourdieu, Passeron 
& Chamboredon, 1968) was that this social science community would be unified 
methodologically without reference to ideological differences.  Reiterating the position taken in 
their “Structuralism and Theory of Sociological Knowledge” (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1968), they 
argued clearly in the Introduction to Le métier de sociologue that 
“The question of the affiliation of a piece of sociological research to a particular theory 
of the social system, that of Marx, or Weber, or Durkheim, for example, is always 
secondary to the question of whether that research belongs to sociological science.  The 
only criterion of this is whether it implements the fundamental principles of the theory of 
sociological knowledge which, as such, in no way separates authors who differ in every 
respect as regards their theory of the social system.  Even if most authors have been led 
to identify their particular theory of the social system with the theory of sociological 
knowledge that they involve, implicitly at least, in their sociological practice, the 
epistemological project can nonetheless use this preliminary distinction as a basis for 
juxtaposing authors whose doctrinal oppositions mask an epistemological agreement.”  
(Bourdieu, Passeron & Chamboredon, 1991, 4-5) 
The intention was to represent sociological explanatory discourse as a pure field of science 
practised by craftsmen sharing a common methodology.  The autonomy of this practice held 
irrespective of differences of culture or ideology.  However, it is important to realise that 
Bourdieu retained philosophical scepticism about the explanatory validity of this constructed, 
autonomous tradition of social science research.  Honneth and his fellow questioners teased out 
this tension when they cross-examined Bourdieu next about his relationship to structuralism.  In 
“The Fragmented World of Symbolic Forms”, Honneth had already identified the way in which 
Bourdieu had become dissatisfied with Lévi-Straussian structuralism, referring in support to the 
account which Bourdieu had himself given in the Preface to Le Sens Pratique (Bourdieu, 1980; 
Bourdieu, 1987 in German; Bourdieu 1990 in English).  Honneth had summarised the 
implications of the influence of Lévi-Strauss in the following way: 
“Bourdieu’s preliminary studies as an anthropologist in French Colonial Algeria, were 
informed by the basic tenets of structural anthropology;  the marriage rites as well as 
myth-telling of the Kabyle he studied were interpreted on the linguistic model as closed 
semiotic systems whose structural order was supposedly related to the constitutive laws 
of the human mind.” (Honneth, in Robbins, 2000, vol. 3., 4)  
He had rightly identified Bourdieu’s objection to the universalist tendency of Lévi-Straussian 
thinking, but the essence of his article had been that Bourdieu’s conception of human agency 
was based upon an unacknowledged value-orientation towards understanding human agency as 
motivated towards making a ‘position-dependent calculus of utilities’.  Having shown that 
Bourdieu’s anthropological researches had caused him to question structuralism, Honneth 
contended that these had 
“… provided the impetus for him to work out his own conception, which to some extent 
took him back to just that type of social-scientific functionalism which Lévi-Strauss’ 
approach had been aimed against” (Honneth, in Robbins, 2000, vol. 3, 4). 
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Bourdieu’s response, in Honneth’s view, was to interpret human agency according to a restricted 
model.  It was a model which was inadequate in terms of moral philosophy.  Following a 
detailed discussion of La distinction, Honneth concluded that: 
“The central economic concepts upon which his cultural analysis is based, compel him to 
subsume all forms of social conflicts under the type of struggles which occur over social 
distribution – although the struggle for the social recognition of moral models clearly 
obeys a different logic.  For the recognition which an existing social order lends to the 
values and norms embodied in the lifestyles of a particular group does not depend on the 
volume of knowledge or wealth, or on the quantity of measurable goods the group has 
managed to accumulate, rather it is determined according to the traditions and value 
conceptions which could be socially generalized and institutionalised in the society.” 
(Honneth, in Robbins 2000, 16-7) 
In other words, for Honneth, Bourdieu was in danger of substituting an unsatisfactory social 
theoretical model for structuralist universalism.  What Honneth did not appear to have realized 
was that Bourdieu’s move away from structuralism was a move towards seeking to understand 
agents as themselves theory-generating agents rather than the objects of interpretation of 
academic social philosophers13.  As Bourdieu put this in response to Honneth’s question in the 
1985 interview: 
“… I was beginning to suspect that the privilege granted to scientific and objectivist 
analysis (genealogical research, for example), in dealing with the natives’ vision of 
things, was perhaps an ideology inherent in the profession.  In short, I wanted to abandon 
the cavalier point of view of the anthropologist who draws up plans, maps, diagrams and 
genealogies.  That is all very well, and inevitable, as one moment, that of objectivism, in 
the anthropologist’s procedures.  But you shouldn’t forget the other possible relation to 
the social world, that of agents really engaged in the market, for example – the level that 
I am interested in mapping out.  One must thus draw up a theory of this non-theoretical, 
partial, somewhat down-to-earth relationship with the social world that is the relation of 
ordinary experience.  And one must also establish a theory of the theoretical relationship, 
a theory of all the implications, starting with the breaking off of practical belonging and 
immediate investment, and its transformation into the distant, detached relationship that 
defines the scientist’s position.”  (Bourdieu, 1990, 20-1) 
In response to further questioning, Bourdieu was equally emphatic that he was not wanting to 
produce a theory of ‘praxis’: 
“I really must point out that I have never used the concept of praxis which, at least in 
French, tends to create the impression of something pompously theoretical – which is 
pretty paradoxical – and makes one think of trendy Marxism, the young Marx, the 
Frankfurt School, Yugoslav Marxism … I’ve always talked, quite simply, of practice.”  
(Bourdieu, 1990, 22) 
Towards the end of the interview, the questioners make explicit the tension that was underlying 
the whole intellectual exchange.  Bourdieu’s emphasis of the practice of agents seemed to be in 
direct opposition to the extent to which Habermas’s continuation of the unfinished project of 
modernity was predicated on the existence of universal norms.  In response to a late question, 
Bourdieu replied: 
“I have a tendency to ask the problem of reason or of norms in a resolutely historicist 
way.  Instead of wondering about the existence of ‘universal interests’, I will ask: who 
                                         
13  My argument is that Bourdieu was not substituting an alternative ‘theory’ for structuralism at all.  
His disposition to interpret behaviour in terms of the position-taking of agents has to be understood rather as 
a function of his own lived experience of social mobility achieved as a result of the acquisition of educational 
qualifications.  For a contemporary recognition that an adequate response to Bourdieu’s work involves re-
thinking the status of ‘social theory’, see the transition from Brubaker (1985, in Robbins, ed., 2000, Vol. 3, 
87-116) to Brubaker (1993). 
has an interest in the universal?  Or rather:  what are the social conditions that have to be 
fulfilled for certain agents to have an interest in the universal?  (Bourdieu, 1990, 31) 
or again, when asked whether there is ‘a stable point, a foundation, which justifies all my 
thoughts’ as, it is contended, is thought to be the case ‘in the German tradition’ (Bourdieu, 1990, 
32), Bourdieu resoluted replied: 
“I discover that one becomes a sociologist, a theoretician, so as to have an absolute point 
of view, a theoria;  and that, for as long as it is unrecognised, this kingly, divine ambition 
is a tremendous cause of error.  So much so that, to escape even a little from the relative, 
one absolutely has to abdicate from the claim to absolute knowledge, uncrown the 
philosopher-king.  And I discover too that in a field at a certain moment, the logic of the 
game is such that certain agents have an interest in the universal.  And, I have to say, I 
think this is true in my case.  But the fact of knowing it, of knowing that I am investing 
personal impulses, linked with my whole life story, in my research, gives me some small 
chance of knowing the limits of my vision.” (Bourdieu, 1990, 33.) 
 
In other words, the interview between Bourdieu and Honneth and his colleagues exposed the 
extent to which Bourdieu was practising social theory without wishing to contribute to the kind 
of social theorising that was emanating from Frankfurt.  Nevertheless, the interview manifested 
an as yet incomplete transition in Bourdieu’s own position. 
 
 
After 1985:  the international dimension of Bourdieu’s practical logic. 
 
After working within the assumptions of the ’empirical-analytical’ discourse of sociology during 
the 1960s, Bourdieu had, in the early 1970s, struggled to find a way to do justice to his original 
phenomenological interests.  This involved locating the discourses of sociology and the 
discourses of structuralism as examples of objectivist knowledge in the three-stage process 
described in “Three Forms of Theoretical Knowledge” (Bourdieu, 1973).  Bourdieu was 
interested in the work of Cassirer at the time because it enabled him both to think about the 
characteristics of ‘science’ as a symbolic form in relation to the practices of objectivist scientists 
and also to think about myth and language as expressions of symbolic agency rather than as inert 
texts which had become the analysis fodder of structuralist anthropologists.  In “On Symbolic 
Power” ( a lecture given in 1973 and published as Bourdieu, 1977), Bourdieu made it clear that 
his use of Cassirer was to enable his own thinking to go beyond the remnants of neo-Kantian 
transcendentalism and to go beyond Panofsky’s historicisation of the philosophy of symbolic 
forms towards an understanding of the social conditions of symbolic conflict.  He did not seek to 
establish this understanding as a revised form of Cassirer’s ‘theory’ but as an instrument for 
understanding that conflicts in scientific understanding are of the same kind, manifesting the 
influence of social conditions, as the conflicts in symbolic expression which the social sciences 
seek to explain. 
 
It is significant that the interview of 1985 took place between the French publication of Homo 
Academicus in 1984 and the English and German translations of 1988, both of which were 
published with an original preface. In my first book on Bourdieu (Robbins, 1991), I discussed 
(pp.162-5) the manifest process of construction of the text of Homo Academicus.  I submit that it 
is clear that much of the information for that book was gathered at about 1968 when Bourdieu 
undertook a ‘sociology of knowledge’ analysis of Parisian higher education.  This was the 
period of Le métier de sociologue (Bourdieu, Passeron, & Chamboredon, 1968), ‘Champ 
intellectuel et projet créateur’ (Bourdieu, 1966), ‘Sociology and Philosophy in France since 
1945’ (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1967) and the work on Panofsky, in which Bourdieu was 
advocating a ‘sociology of sociology’ as a form of Bachelardian ‘rupture épistémologique’ and 
also beginning to articulate the post-structuralist emphasis on agency which was presented in 
Esquisse d’une théorie de la pratique (Bourdieu, 1972).  Homo Academicus re-visited the early 
data in the light of the work of the 1970s, particularly the project on Le Patronat which was 
subsequently published in La Noblesse d’Etat (Bourdieu, 1989) and, of course, the work on taste 
which led from the article on ‘L’anatomie du goût’ (Bourdieu & de Saint Martin, 1976) to La 
Distinction (Bourdieu, 1979).  In other words, the text of Homo Academicus was able to 
superimpose the sociological analysis articulated in his ‘Les stratégies de reconversion’ 
(Bourdieu, Boltanski & de Saint Martin, 1973) on the primary sociology of knowledge.  This 
meant that the text was no longer a sociology of ideas but instead a sociology of the deployment 
of ideas in the position-taking of social agents – situating agents and ideas in the competing 
fields of power and economics. 
 
By the time of the publication of Homo Academicus (Bourdieu, 1984), however, the text was not 
simply an analysis which now recognized the relationship between agency and structure within 
Parisian higher education (including Bourdieu’s reflexive recognition of his own position and 
agency).  It was much more.  The text was an instrument of Bourdieu’s agency.  Around the 
time of his appointment to the Chair of Sociology at the Collège de France in 1981, Bourdieu 
had been aware that he was about to be associated with an institution which already possessed 
recognized ‘institutional capital’ and that this association could affect him ambivalently.  On the 
one hand the institution strengthened his formal authority and his capacity to hold influential 
power but, on the other hand, the institution might symbolize an educational tradition which 
would seem to be at odds with the view of education that Bourdieu had developed in his 
empirical research of the 1960s.  The issue which Bourdieu explored in an article of 1975 on 
fashion – ‘Le couturier et sa griffe’ (Bourdieu & Y. Delsaut, 1975) – was relevant to his own 
intellectual situation.  He wanted to be able to harness the power of the institution without 
forfeiting the convictions which arose from his personal habitus.  From the mid-1980s, Bourdieu 
was acutely conscious of the same tension in the relationship  between his international label 
(griffe) and the specific social conditions which generated his research, his conceptual 
framework, and his published findings.  ‘The genesis of the concepts of habitus and field’ 
(Bourdieu, 1985) was an attempt to apply reflexively to his own concepts the approach which he 
had accepted in earlier articles such as ‘Genèse et structure du champ religieux’ (Bourdieu, 
1971).  If, as Bourdieu argued in Le métier de sociologue (Bourdieu, Passeron & Chamboredon, 
1968), concepts are tools, elements of an ars inveniendi, what happens to them when they 
become severed from the conditions in which they were instrumentally effective?  What is the 
appropriate reaction to their being used pragmatically for different purposes in different 
contexts? 
 
Bourdieu worried about this fundamental issue and his anxiety lay behind much of his work 
between 1985 and 1995 by which time, it seemed, he almost decided that his griffe was beyond 
his personal control and that he could only still exercise the kind of influence he wanted by 
direct social action and by adopting communicative devices which would by-pass the global 
market of theoretical texts – the management of the publishing venture, Liber: Raisons d’agir; 
participation in the production of the film, La sociologie est un sport de combat; and active 
encouragement of European social movements.  Bourdieu’s concern manifested itself forcibly in 
the Preface to the English Edition of Homo Academicus (Bourdieu, 1988) and in articles which 
discussed the misrepresentation of his work:  ‘Concluding Remarks:  for a sociogenetic 
understanding of intellectual works’ (1993); which outlined a framework for analyzing 
international intellectual transmission:  ‘Les conditions sociales de la circulation internationale 
des idées’ (Bourdieu, 1989) and ‘Les ruses de la raison impérialiste’ (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 
2000);  which directly considered conceptual transfer such as most of the essays collected in 
Practical Reason (Bourdieu, 1998);  and which reflected more generally on the international 
function or potential function of intellectuals: ‘On the Possibility of a Field of World Sociology’ 
(Bourdieu, 1991) and ‘The Corporatism of the Universal:  the role of intellectuals in the modern 
world’ (Bourdieu, 1989). 
 
If you take these texts in sequence, my interpretation is roughly as follows:  The English Preface 
to Homo Academicus constituted an attempt by Bourdieu to protect his own griffe by pre-
emptively offering the text as the context of its own production.  The lecture given at the 
inauguration of the Freiburg Frankreich Zentrum was a move towards recommending an 
objective sociological analysis of the circulation of ideas, but it was precisely this – taking 
examples from the circulation of interpretations of Heidegger and Nietzsche without, for 
instance, accommodating the kind of analysis of the conditions of production of Heidegger’s 
work that he had already written in “L’ontologie politique de Martin Heidegger” (Bourdieu, 
1975).  Methodologically, I am simply saying that “Les conditions sociales de la circulation 
internationale des idées” is at the same stage in relation to trans-cultural analysis as was the 
original empirical research which lay behind Homo Academicus.  Several of the texts of the late 
1980s and early 1990s were distorted by Bourdieu’s political  attempt during these years to 
construct a trans-national field of intellectuals, and this was associated with a quest for universal 
invariants which was in conflict with his earlier post-structuralist particularism.  However, “Les 
ruses de la raison impérialiste” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 2000) seems to point the way within the 
field of international relations to a sociological analysis of intellectual agents.  It was an article 
which used objectivist analysis for direct, polemical engagement rather than, as in Homo 
Academicus, as a way of offering a controlled and controlling self-presentation.  It was an article 
which began with a passionate recognition that universalist claims are the products of particular 
circumstances. 
 
 
Bourdieu’s legacy for international social understanding:  the dialectical relationship 
between theory and practice, objectivity and subjectivity. 
 
 
There co-existed in Bourdieu’s thought a desire to institutionalise a discourse of world 
sociology, providing a forum for intellectual exchange between researchers adhering to the same 
methodological practices, and, simultaneously, a desire to recognize that this would be a 
discourse of objectivism and a community of like-minded objectivists exercising ‘symbolic 
violence’ while the essence of the necessary analysis ought to be concerned with the particular 
circumstances in which local objectivisms might be generated within national ‘sub-fields’.  This 
competing urge explains the contrast between the argument advanced in “On the Possibility of a 
Field of World Sociology” (Bourdieu, 1991) and the contemporary position presented in “For a 
socio-genetic understanding of intellectual works” (Bourdieu, 1993).  The contrast here 
replicates the contrast between the objectivist sociology of sociology of Le métier de sociologue 
and the incipiently reflexive analysis outlined first in Esquisse d’une théorie de la pratique.  
There was, however, no contradiction.  Bourdieu insisted that his reflexivity entailed an 
understanding of the objectivist structure of social possibilities within which his individual 
intellectual identity developed.  In his final years, he came, perhaps, to emphasize his sense that 
he needed to articulate the grounds of his science in his lived experience and to recognize that 
there needed to be an encounter between experiential difference rather than a superimposition of 
intellectual uniformity, but it was no accident that his final course of lectures at the Collège de 
France treated the question of ‘the science of science and reflexivity’ (published as Science de la 
science et réflexivité, Bourdieu, 2001) and that he should choose that the opening page of his 
posthumously published Esquisse pour une auto-analyse (Bourdieu, 2003) should state 
categorically and humorously (recalling Magritte) that “Ceci n’est pas une autobiographie” (This 
is not an autobiography). 
 
There was a constant tension in Bourdieu’s work between the urge to be a practising, 
quantitative social scientist, sharing problems and findings within a self-validating intellectual 
community, and the desire to uncover the pre-scientific foundations of science-making activity.  
This tension enabled him to represent the claims for universality of Western European 
philosophy of social science in relation to their specifically arbitrary or contingent temporal and 
geographical conditions of production.  As an explanatory system, social science might be 
functionally dependent on an a-cultural consensus of methodologies and techniques, but this 
system should be seen as one amongst a series of competing, culturally different explanatory 
alternatives. In his self-presentation, Bourdieu consciously contributed to an understanding of 
the ‘socio-genetic’origins of social practices.  In his memory, this collection of articles is an 
invitation to reflect on the local nature of his thinking and to follow his lead in celebrating the 
potential for international human relations to be realised by recognizing alternative forms of 
thought generated in alternative localities. 
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